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Abstract—The pervasiveness of the Android operating system, 
with the availability of applications almost for everything, is 
readily accessible in the official Google play store or a dozen 
alternative third-party markets. Additionally, the vital role of 
smartphones in modern life leads to store significant 
information on devices, not only personal information but also 
corporate information, which attract malware developers to 
develop applications that can infiltrate user’s devices to steal 
information and perform harmful tasks. This accompanied 
with the limitation of currently defenses techniques such as 
ineffective screening in Google play store, weak or no screening 
in third-party markets. Antiviruses software that still relies on 
a signature-based database that is effective only in identifying 
known malware. To contrive with malicious applications that 
are increased in volume and sophistication, we propose an 
Android malware detection system that applies deep learning 
technique to face the threats of Android malware. Extensive 
experiments on a real-world dataset contain benign and 
malicious applications uncovered that the proposed system 
reaches an accuracy of 95.31%. 
Keywords- Machine learning, Deep learning, Malware detection, 
Android security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, noticeable amid the most substantial devices 
you can use to assist with your life is a smartphone. There 
are numerous things that you can accomplish with a 
smartphone in various ways (checking email, messaging 
companions, checking the climate and news, making 
appointments, making bank transactions, etc.). Smartphone 
corporations dispatched a sum of 1.46 billion devices in 
2017. The Android seized around 85% of the overall 
smartphone volume [34]. According to IDC, five out of six 
new phones were running Android. Ericsson forecasts there 
could be upwards of 6.4 billion smartphone users close to the 
ending of 2020, nearly one for each individual [10]. 
Smartphones are a progressively appealing focus for online 
criminals. Therefore, they are putting resources into more 
advanced assaults that are powerful at taking precious 
individual information or blackmailing money from prey. 
Android users persist as the dominant victim of malicious 
developers. SophosLabs has processed the approximately 10 
million Android samples submitted by Sophos clients for 
investigation before the end of 2017. This is up from the 8.5 
million handled through all of 2016. For 2017, the number 
was up to almost 3.5 million. By far most are really 
malicious, with 77% of the submitted instances ending up 
being malware [15]. At the beginning of 2018, the G DATA 
security professionals recognized an average of 9,411 
advanced malware daily for the Android. This implies a new 
malware emerging every 10 seconds. For the entire 2018, the 
G DATA analysts are estimating around 3.4 million new 
Android malware [22]. The situation even worsens by the 
fact that some adware is pre-installed on a few hundred 
various Android-powered device models and versions, 
according to the Avast Threat Labs [44]. 
The bulk of accessible applications in the Google Play 
Store were most as of late set at 3.3 million applications in 
March 2018 [4]. In May 2017, Google reported its new 
implicit malware defense for Android, Play Protect, which 
verifies applications and APK files whenever they are 
downloaded utilizing the Google official store or third-party 
stores. Since August 2017 and afterward, it has been 
accessible on all Android devices with Google Play Services 
11 or above, and is set up on devices with Android 8.0 and 
above. However, when Play Protect is tested, it's only able to 
detect 51.8% of the test cases [37]. Another defense 
mechanism against Android malware is Android Antivirus. 
The principle disadvantage of antivirus applications is that 
they depend on the signature-based database for malware 
detection [18]. While signature-based antivirus is efficient in 
identifying known malware, they come short in 
distinguishing new malware. Besides they can be overcome 
by changing the manners by which an attack is made. To 
overcome signature-based limitations, heuristic scanning is 
proposed, which uses rules to search for commands that may 
suggest malicious intentions. But malware can evade 
heuristic scanning if they manage to mask their malicious 
action [47]. To settle the problem of heuristic search, 
machine learning methods are proposed. Machine learning 
approaches are able to find certain patterns to identify 
formerly not observed malware instances. The increasing 
complication of Android malware requires a new detection 
strategy that is robust enough to be circumvented. To this 
end deep learning as a subset of machine learning introduced 
to detect Android malware. 
In this work, we inspect the use of the deep neural 
network to Android malware detection by extracting features 
from AndroidManifest file and java files that fed into the 
deep neural network (DNN) classifier for classification of 
apps into benign or malicious. Real-world samples have been 
collected from different open sources. A comprehensive test 
is performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
system. Results unveil that the schemed system is competent 
to identify malware. The major contribution of this study to 
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the development of malware detection techniques using deep 
learning are as follows: 
• The proposition of a novel Android malware detection 
approach builds on deep learning 
• implementation of a model that performs static analysis 
to provide five different feature sets: permission 
combinations; API calls; intent filters; valid certificates; 
the presence of APK files in the asset folder. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first time these features are 
synthesized for Android malware detection 
• Collection of malware dataset that involves various 
malware types from 2013 up to 2017 and benign dataset 
the contain different application categories 
• A comprehensive test of the system that includes 
evaluating the system with different features set, 
comparing the performance of the DNN with commonly 
machine learning methods, and comparing the system 
with some other works in the literature. 
 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
relates the concerned works done Android malware 
detection. The proposed methodology is demonstrated in 
Section 3. Followed by Section 4 which shows and discusses 
the results of comprehensive experimenting. Finally, Section 
5 concludes the study by underlining important points. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Lately, the utilization of machine learning and deep 
learning methods into the analysis of Android malware has 
grown into a dynamic research field. This section reviews 
some of the presently concerned works of machine learning 
and deep learning for static analysis and dynamic analysis in 
Android malware detection and classification. 
 
1. Android Malware Detection using Deep learning 
Zhenlong Yuan et al. in [43], explored the use of deep 
learning in Android malware identification by using static 
and dynamic features extracted from APK files. The authors 
developed a deep belief network (DBN) model for 
classification utilizing small dataset and achieved high 
detection accuracy. Zhenlong Yuan et al. [31], developed 
Droiddetector based on their previous work [43], an Android 
detection system based on deep learning that can identify 
Android malware automatically by using large dataset and 
numerous features. The results showed that deep learning 
methods can accomplish remarkable accuracy, surpassing 
conventional machine learning methods. Lifan Xu et al. [35], 
developed HADM a hybrid Android malware classification 
method. The deep autoencoder was used to study static and 
dynamic apps features. Then support vector machines 
utilized for classification. The performance of the model was 
evaluated separately for static features and dynamic features. 
Static features provide much better accuracy than dynamic 
features. 
Shifu Hou et al. [40], designed DroidDelver an automatic 
Android malware characterization system employing DBN 
depending only on extracted API call blocks from the smali 
code. Testing results illustrated the high performance of 
DBN over shallow architecture methods. Xin Su et al [19], 
proposed DroidDeep a malware identification scheme for the 
Android platform relying on static features. The DBN was 
used to study the features and Support Vector machine 
implemented for malware classification.  The results 
demonstrated high performance not merely in the test dataset 
but also in comparison with similar approaches. Shifu Hou et 
al. [3], developed an automated Android malware detector 
Deep4MalDroid. Resting on a graph representation of 
extracted Linux system call, the Stacked Autoencoders 
(SAEs) was used to study common patterns of malware and 
hence to identify newly unknown malicious applications. 
Niall McLaughlin et al. [8], motivated by the success of a 
convolutional neural network (CNN) in natural language 
processing, presented an Android malware detection system 
based on CNN. They employed opcode sequences to 
perform malware classification. A series of experiments 
were conducted, and the results demonstrated good accuracy 
in the testing dataset but, the accuracy dropped when the 
system tested on a new dataset larger than the testing dataset. 
Ton et al. [48] developed a color- heightened CNN for 
malware detection. They built color representations for 
transforming Android apps into RGB color code and 
interpret them into a defined sized encoded image. Then the 
encoded image was forwarded to CNN for automated feature 
drawing and learning. Although the main objective was to 
create an automated system, results suggest that sample 
collection and model updates are still required. R. 
Vinayakumar et al. [45], examined the use of long short-term 
memory (LSTM) for Android malware identification. They 
performed several tests using various LSTM (a technique to 
check long-range dependencies through time-varying 
patterns) network topologies with several network 
parameters on extracted features employing static and 
dynamic analysis. The reported results indicated a good 
performance of the LSTM in comparison with the recurrent 
neural network and shallow machine learning architecture. 
 
2. Android Malware Detection using Machine Learning 
Andrew Bedford et al. [51] developed ANDRANA a 
malware detection approach based on machine learning 
algorithms. ANDRANA utilizes static analysis to identify 
features, and Machine Learning algorithms to distinguish 
if these features are good enough to decide an application 
as a malware. ANDRAN analyzes applications in three 
stages. In the first phase, the app was disassembled to 
acquire its code. Then, applying static analysis, the 
application’s features are drawn. Finally, a classification 
algorithm determines from the set of features if the 
application is malicious. Borja Sanz et al. [52] proposed 
Manifest Analysis for Malware detection in Android 
(MAMA). A method for Android malware detection. 
This approach was based on certain features obtained 
from the Manifest file of Android applications. 
Specifically, they utilized the permissions and the feature 
tags within the manifest file. These features are then 
employed to construct supervised machine-learning 
algorithms to identify malicious applications.  
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A. Feizollah et al. [27] designed AndroDialysis a 
malware identifier depending on the analysis of two 
different sorts of Intents (implicit and explicit Intents) 
extracted from benign and malicious apps. The 
performance of the system was evaluated using Intent 
only which achieved 91% accuracy versus 83% using 
permissions. Combination of Intent and permission led to 
better detection accuracy. Babu et al. [53] proposed 
DROIDSWAN a system for Android malware detection, 
established on static analysis of Android APK. 
DroidSwan extracts numerous essential features from an 
Android application gives weight to these features and 
constructs a classification model utilizing machine 
learning algorithms. S. Y. Yerima et al. [25] developed a 
malware detection system based on various features to 
build multiple machine learning classifiers in parallel 
with the purpose of obtaining better accuracy. Hui Juan 
et al. [54] proposed HEMD Android malware 
characterization system built on Random Forest and 
utilizing diverse static features. The best accuracy 
obtained by HEMD was 89.91%. 
 Mas' ud et al. [55] designed malware detection 
system using dynamic analysis resting on five different 
set of features and applying five different machine 
learning classifiers with the objective of acquiring the 
best combination for efficient Android malware 
identification. The experimental results show that a 
multilayer perceptron classifier provides the best 
accuracy. 
III. THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
1. Android Application Overview 
Android applications (also refers to as apps) are 
principally written in Java. The Android SDK set of 
development and debugging tools for Android arrange the 
code alongside resource files and data into an APK, an 
Android package file format with an APK suffix. One 
APK file includes all of the constituents of an Android app 
and is the file that Android-controlled devices use to set up 
the application [11]. There are four fundamental 
components namely Activities; services; broadcast 
receivers; content providers that formulate the Android 
application. Every component represents an entry point for 
which the system or a client can enter the application. 
Prior to run any of the application components, the 
Android system must recognize that the component occurs 
by parsing the application's AndroidManifest.xml file. It is 
a precondition for the application to specify each 
component in this file, and obliged to be at the base of the 
app project directory. 
    Reverse engineering is a technique exploited to 
analyze Android malware. In this procedure, the application 
is decompiled to understand its working and functionality by 
analyzing the code. When APK file decompiled, it contains 
the following components [5], [6]: 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustrate the proposed methodology 
 
• Meta-inf Folder: comprise of data that enables clients to 
ensure the security of the Android and completeness of 
the APK application. 
• Res Folder: comprise XML specifying the layout, 
attributes, languages, etc... 
• Classes.dex: hold the whole Java source code that is 
compiled. This file is run on the Android Runtime 
(ART). This file comprises the entire bytecode that ART 
will compile. 
• AndroidMainifest.xml File. 
• Resources.arsc: this file is a binary resource file that is 
obtained after compilation 
2. The Structure of The Proposed Methodology 
     Fig. 1 outline the structural design of the proposed 
methodology. The proposed methodology consists of the 
following steps: 
• Apps de-compilation: The Mobile Security Framework 
(MobSF) [16] which, is a powerful tool for Android 
malware analysis that is capable of retrieving the code 
from obfuscated apps was used to unpackage and 
decompile the APK files 
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• Features Extraction: MobSF is also used to extract 
features from two files, first, Androidmanifest.xml, 
which include the Permissions and Intent filters. Then 
the APIs calls are drawn from smali files generated by 
MobSF. The asset folder is screened for the presence of 
APK files. Finally, the legitimacy of the certificate is 
verified 
• Feature Vector: All of the extracted features are 
transformed into a feature vector. 
• DNN Classifier: Building upon the extracted features 
the DNN study features to characterize Android apps 
• Classification: By applying the DNN classifier, the new 
unknown apps will be labeled as benign or malicious. 
3. Features Set 
          Permissions combination(fs1): permission is confinement 
restricting access to a portion of the code or data on a device. 
The restriction is enforced access to defend vital data and 
code that could be abused to harm the user’s experience. 
Permissions are employed to grant or constrain an 
application access to restricted APIs and resources [46]. 
Permissions that are requested by an application can suggest 
its functionality to some extent. However, permissions can 
service both malicious apps and benign ones. In this manner, 
it is essential to combine various permission requests 
together for more accurate malware identification [20], [29]. 
 
      Intent Filters(fs2): The intent is an informing object 
that can be implemented to demand an action from another 
app component and is regarded as a security method to 
block applications from attaining access to other 
applications directly. Malware applications frequently listen 
to particular intents [7], [27]. 
      API Calls(fs3): APIs used by an application decides the 
real usefulness and capacity of the application. Static 
examines of the APIs handled in an application is crucial to 
empathize with what the application really plans to do. 
Specific API calls allow access to system services or 
resources of the device and are often discovered in 
malicious applications. As these calls can be particularly 
direct to malicious behavior [28]. The following API calls 
are examined: Telephony Manager. [25]; HTTP connection 
and sockets [36]; DexcClassLoader [32]; reflection; System 
Service; Runtime and System; cryptographic operations 
(crypto) [23]. 
 Invalid certificate(fs4): To verify the validity of the 
certificate. An invalid certificate proves that the application 
has been modified(repackaged) [12]. 
Presence of APK (fs5) files in the asset folder: 
Concealing data in asset folder is considered a typical 
behavior of the malicious application. [38] 
4. Feature Vector 
     All of the extracted features are transformed into a 
feature vector. Each feature set is defined as a Boolean 
expression with different dimensions and then generates a 
unified representation by mapping different sets into a joint 
vector space. For evaluation, the defined combination of 
defined feature set S: 
              (1) 
| Si |- dimension set Si is used to represent a feature set 
which is a vector of zeros with a ‘1’ in the position if 
malware has used a certain feature in the feature set. 
Therefore, we can convert any application X to a vector 
space ( ) :x    
   
| |: {0,1} , ( ) ( ( , )) (2)sx x I x s s S →  →    
Where the indicator function ( , )I x s  is defined as: 
  
   Therefore, different features can be mapped to into unified 
joint vector. 
5. Deep Neural Network (DNN) 
       Deep learning lets computational models that are 
compiled from different processing layers to find out 
representations of data with different levels of abstraction. 
Deep learning recognizes sophisticated structure in 
substantial data sets by applying the back-propagation 
algorithm to demonstrate how a machine should adjust its 
inside parameters that are applied to calculate the 
representation in every layer from the representation in the 
former layer [30]. Deep neural networks are deep learning 
methods, which enable them to study complicated nonlinear 
functions of a given input for the purpose of decreasing error 
value. 
       The DNN used to implement a classification task may 
have the following generic architecture: an input layer, 
which is provided with some input vectors constituting the 
data; 2 or more hidden layers, where a transformation is 
utilized to the output of the former layer, receiving a higher-
level representation as we go off from the input layer; and 
an output layer, which calculates the output of the deep 
neural network. In this final layer, the output is equated 
(with regard to supervised learning) to the class label (true 
value) and the error standard is employed to calculate the 
cost [39]. 
    The model is determined by its arguments: weight 
matrices Wj, j−1, and bias vectors bj, with j moving from 1 to 
the number of hidden layers. These arguments are tuned 
repeatedly to minimize the cost function, commonly with 
stochastic gradient descent. Then, an assigned training set 
(x(i), y(i)), where x(i) is a stated feature vector and y(i) its 
comparable class, each hidden layer implements a non-
linear translation function g to the output of the former 
layer. This translation considers the arguments W and b 
which associate one layer to its former one, and renders the 
activation values of neurons with the next equations [39]: 
( )
, 1 1( ) ( ( ), 2,..., 1
i i
j j j j jh x g w h x b j N− −= + = − (3) 
( )
1 0,1 1 1)( ) (
i i
jh x g w h x b−= +    (4) 
Lastly, for a classification job, the output layer calculates a 
softmax function, which produces the probability P of a 
given input x to pertain to a certain class c: 
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1
exp( ( )
( | ( ))
exp( ( )
c c
l l l
c k k
l l lk
w h x b
P c h x
W h x b
=
+
=
+
(5) 
where hl(x) indicates the final hidden layer activation for 
input x, and stand for the weights matrix and bias vector 
recipient, which link the output unit for class c with the final 
hidden layer, and C is the whole number of classes. To tune 
the arguments to the job, a cost function is regarded, 
attempting to minimize the error between the prediction 
(network output) and the true class, and arguments are 
adjusted gradually through backpropagation [39].  
6.      Dataset Setup 
      For all the experiments, we look at a dataset of real 
Android apps and malware. The dataset contains 1200 apps 
in total, including 600 benign apps and 600 malicious apps. 
570 apps out of the 600 benign apps were downloaded from 
the official Google play store in September 2017. The rest 
of the apps were downloaded from a third market APKpure 
[49], within the same period. The benign apps belong to 
different categories, as described in Table 1.  And exemplify 
popular apps in their respective category (All the 
downloaded apps have at least 500,000 installations). All 
benign apps passed the scan of the latest versions of 3 
Antivirus, ESET Internet Security 11.2, Symantec Endpoint 
14, and Kaspersky Internet Security 18. 
    The malware samples come from different open sources 
as detailed in Table 2. Malicious apps represent different 
malware types such as Trojan horses, Backdoors, 
Information Stealers, Ransomware, Scareware, Fakeware, 
and remote access Trojans. The malware was selected from 
samples collected from May 2013 up to December 2017.  
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION   
     After a thorough demonstration of the proposed system, 
we now go forward to an empirical evaluation considering 
the performance of the proposed system. 
1. Experiments Set Up 
     The dataset is split into a training set (80%) and a 
validation set (20%), and the deep neural network model is 
built using Keras utilizing TensorFlow’s backend. Fig. 2 
describes the structure of the deep neural network. Relu and 
softmax are used as activation functions. Gradient Descent 
is used for optimization. Mean Squared Error is used to 
measure the error. 
2. Malware Detection 
     In this experiment, the proposed system malware 
detection is evaluated according to the performance metrics 
described in Table 3.  The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustrate DNN parameters 
 
TABLE 1. BENIGN APPS CATEGORIES  
 
Apps categories and subcategories Number of Apps 
Security (Antivirus- Password 
managers- VPN- Parental lock- 
Lock screen) 
60 
Books and magazines 24 
Web browsers 21 
Business and finance 23 
Education 32 
Family (parenting) 12 
Food 14 
Games (Strategy- Race- Music- 
Board -Sport-Casino) 
53 
Health and fitness 23 
Image editing 42 
Launchers 19 
Maps 20 
Medical 16 
Messengers 23 
Multimedia 26 
News 23 
Office  24 
Music and podcast 21 
Shopping  19 
Sport 20 
Translations 10 
Utilities 59 
Videos 16 
Total 600 
 
   TABLE 2.  MALWARE SAMPLES SOURCES 
 
Source NO. of samples 
Contagio Mobile malware minidump 
[42] 
44 
DroidBench [17] 30 
GitHub- Android malware master [14] 80 
Viruschare [13] 300 
Virussign [50] 146 
Total 600 
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TABLE 3.  PERFORMANCE METRICS 
 
Terms Description 
True Positive (TP) Number of samples correctly 
distinguished as malicious 
True Negative (TN) Number of samples correctly 
distinguished as benign 
False Positive (FP) Number of samples erroneously 
distinguished as malicious 
False Negative (FN) Number of samples erroneously 
distinguished as benign 
Accuracy (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) 
Precision TP/(TP+FP) 
Recall TP/(TP+FN) 
F1-Score 2*((precision*recall)/ (precision 
+recall)) 
 
TABLE 4.  THE PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF THE 
DNN 
 
Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score 
95.31 95.35 95.31 95.31 
 
      Table 4.  Demonstrate that the ability of the proposed 
system to identify an app as benign or malicious is 95.31%. 
The precision of correctly classified apps within all 
classified apps is 95.35%. The ratio (recall) of correctly 
identified benign samples is 95.31%. The F1-Score which 
points to how much the model determinate is 95.31%. 
    Fig. 3 show the loss in training and validation sets which 
is remained small and reflect the good performance of the 
model. 
 
    Figure 3.  The loss in training and validation sets 
 
    Furthermore, Fig. 4 display the accuracy in training and 
validation sets that indicate the good performance of the 
model as well. 
 
    Figure 4.  Accuracy in training and validation sets 
 
3. Comparisons of Detection Using Different Features 
Set 
     In this experiment, the performance of malware 
identification is compared among the features set. The 
results are interpreted in Table 5. 
 
 TABLE 5 EVALUATION OF THE DNN USING   
DIFFERENT FEATURES SET 
 
Features Set Accuracy 
All Features Set 95.31 
APIs Only 90.10 
Permissions Combination Only 82.29 
Intent-filters Only 69.79 
APIs + Permissions combination + Invalid 
Certificate + Presence of APK file in asset 
folder 
93.22 
APIs + Intent-filters + Invalid Certificate + 
Presence of APK file in asset folder 
91.14 
Permissions Combination+ Invalid 
Certificate + Presence of APK file in asset 
folder 
83.33 
 
      From the results in Table 5. We can note that the best 
accuracy is achieved when all features are used in the 
classification process. Using APIs + Permissions 
combination + Invalid Certificate + Presence of the APK 
file in the asset folder come second best with 93.22% while, 
using APIS only yielded 90.10%. Permissions combination 
alone gives only 82.29%, adding the Invalid Certificate + 
Presence of the APK file in the asset folder that raised its 
accuracy to 83.33%. Using Intent Filters only provides the 
poorest accuracy among all features set. This is because 
there are many Intent filters used by both malicious and 
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benign apps. Thus, the accuracy increases when Intent 
filters are used in combination with some other features. 
4. Comparisons of Common Machine Learning 
Methods in Malware Detection 
     In this experiment, the performance of the proposed 
system is compared with 4 common machine learning 
methods Decision Tree (DT), K-nearest neighbor (KNN), 
Random Forest (RF), and Support vector machines (SVM) 
using the same setting applied to evaluate DNN. The results 
are displayed in Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
  Figure 5.  Comparison of common machine learning method 
with the proposed system 
      Fig. 5 shows that the proposed system exceeds the 
common machine learning methods in all performance 
metrics. SVM attained the second-best accuracy with 
91.7%. The KNN produced the least accuracy 88.7% among 
all classifiers. 
5. Comparison with Some Other Works in Literature 
In this experiment, further, the proposed system is compared 
with some other works in literature in terms of accuracy. 
The result of the comparison is explained in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
WITH SOME OTHER WORK IN THE LITERATURE 
 
Approach Accuracy 
This work 95.31 
W. Li et al. [33] 90 
M. Ganesh Li et al.  [9] 93 
H. Liang et al. [24] 93.16 
F. Martinelli et al. [2] 90 
H. Alshahrani et al. [1] 95 
L. Xu et al. [35] 94.7 
S. Hou et al. [26] 96.66 
S. Hou et al [3] 93.68 
T. Huang et al. [48] 93 
Z. Wang et al. [21] 93.09 
 
As can be noted from Table 6. The proposed system 
provides better accuracy than the approaches in the 
literature except [26], which, has a slightly higher accuracy 
than the proposed system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The unprecedented increase of Android malware in a 
previous couple of years, besides the drawbacks in current 
protection mechanism, requires an efficient solution to 
restrain Android malware. In this work, we propose a system 
for Android malware detection using the deep neural 
network, which uses permissions combination, Intent filters, 
Invalid certificate, the existence of APK file in asset folder, 
and API calls as features to construct a deep neural network 
(DNN) that is capable of identifying malicious from benign 
ones.   Comprehensive test results with different features set 
reveal that the proposed system achieves 95.31% accuracy. 
The performance of the system is compared with common 
machine learning methods, results show the proposed system 
surpasses the machine learning methods in all performance 
metrics. Finally, the performance of the proposed system is 
equated with some other work in literature, in terms of 
accuracy, the results denote that the proposed system 
delivers better accuracy than most recent work. 
As future work, we look for more improvement in the 
accuracy of malware detection by exploring other deep 
learning methods. 
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